AUTOMOTIVE
SERVICE CONTRACT · VIEW: GOV
Axiom
Example
Constraints
MUST: Cite ISO 26262, SAE J3016, or domain-specific standard for automotive claims MUST: Map ASIL level to MAGIC checkset governance tier MUST: Distinguish between SAE Levels 0-5 with explicit ODD and fallback definitions MUST NOT: Present Level 2 (partial automation) as autonomous driving
COVERAGE: 255/255
SPEC
Specification
AUTOMOTIVE = AUTOMOTIVE_STANDARD × CANONIC
= Structure(automotive) × (C1, C2, Temporal, Relational, C5, C6)
Lattice: 6 governance checks = ENTERPRISE (#63)
Dimensional Mapping
| Dimension | Bit | Automotive Governance |
|---|---|---|
| C1 | private | Safety goals — ASIL-classified hazard declarations from HARA |
| C2 | private | ASIL evidence — test reports, FMEA, safety case, PPAP documentation |
| T (Temporal) | 4 | OTA timing — update windows, rollback deadlines, safety response latency |
| R (Relational) | 8 | V2X boundaries — communication range, trust domains, certificate authorities |
| C5 | private | Driving operations — SAE level mode transitions, ODD monitoring, fallback |
| C6 | private | Vehicle architecture — E/E topology, domain controllers, zonal architecture |
ASIL-to-MAGIC Tier Mapping
| ASIL | Risk | MAGIC Tier | Bits | Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASIL A | Low | COMMUNITY | #35 | Basic safety monitoring, single-point fault detection |
| ASIL B | Medium | BUSINESS | #43 | Dual-channel verification, diagnostic coverage ≥ 90% |
| ASIL C | High | ENTERPRISE | #63 | Full governance, SPFM ≥ 97% |
| ASIL D | Highest | AGENT | #127 | + C7 governance, SPFM ≥ 99%, PMHF < 10^-8/h |
Subdomains
Passenger Vehicles
Standard: ISO 26262 (Functional Safety), FMVSS, EU GSR
ASIL Range: ASIL A-D
Governance: ENTERPRISE (#63) minimum for safety-critical
Application: Sedans, SUVs, minivans, hatchbacks
Key Systems: Braking (ABS/ESC), steering (EPS), airbags, ADAS
Regulation: NHTSA (US), UNECE (EU), MLIT (Japan), GB (China)
Commercial Vehicles
Standard: ISO 26262, UNECE R13 (braking), R79 (steering)
ASIL Range: ASIL B-D
Governance: ENTERPRISE (#63) minimum
Application: Trucks, buses, trailers, construction vehicles
Key Systems: Advanced Emergency Braking (AEB), Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Regulation: FMCSA (US), EU Directive 2007/46/EC
Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs platooning coordination, fleet-wide OTA
Electric Vehicles (EV)
Standard: ISO 26262, IEC 61851 (EV charging), ISO 15118 (V2G communication)
ASIL Range: ASIL B-D (battery management = ASIL D)
Governance: ENTERPRISE (#63) minimum
Application: BEV, PHEV, FCEV
Key Systems: Battery Management System (BMS), thermal management, charging
Key Hazards: Thermal runaway, electrical isolation failure, high-voltage exposure
Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs cell-level monitoring, charging session governance
Autonomous Vehicles
Standard: SAE J3016, ISO 26262, UNECE R157 (ALKS), ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF)
ASIL Range: ASIL D
Governance: AGENT (#127) for Level 4-5
Application: Robotaxis, autonomous trucks, last-mile delivery
Key Systems: Sensor fusion (LiDAR, camera, radar), planning, decision-making
Regulation: NHTSA ADS framework, UNECE WP.29, StVG (Germany)
Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs ODD transitions, sensor fusion gating, MRC execution
Connected Vehicles
Standard: IEEE 802.11p, 3GPP C-V2X, SAE J2735/J2945, ISO/SAE 21434
ASIL Range: ASIL A-C
Governance: BUSINESS (#43) minimum
Application: V2V safety warnings, V2I traffic optimization, V2P protection
Key Systems: On-Board Unit (OBU), Roadside Unit (RSU), SCMS PKI
Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs message authentication, trust boundary enforcement
Motorsport
Standard: FIA regulations, homologation requirements, race-specific safety
ASIL Range: ASIL B-C (race systems), ASIL D (safety systems)
Governance: BUSINESS (#43) minimum
Application: Formula 1, WEC, WRC, NASCAR, Formula E
Key Systems: Telemetry, HANS device, halo, energy recovery (KERS/MGU)
Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs real-time telemetry governance, strategy compliance
Regulatory Landscape
| Standard | Scope | Governance |
|---|---|---|
| ISO 26262 | Functional safety — road vehicles | ASIL A-D → MAGIC checkset tier |
| SAE J3016 | Driving automation levels | Level-dependent |
| IATF 16949 | Automotive quality management | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| UNECE WP.29 | Global vehicle regulations | Type approval framework |
| ISO/SAE 21434 | Cybersecurity engineering | CAL 1-4 → MAGIC checkset tier |
| FMVSS | US federal motor vehicle safety | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| EU GSR | EU general safety regulation | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| ISO/PAS 21448 | Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF) | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| ISO 15118 | Vehicle-to-grid communication | BUSINESS (#43) |
| UNECE R157 | Automated Lane Keeping Systems | AGENT (#127) |
Prior Art Landscape
| Competitor | Approach | MAGIC checkset Distinction |
|---|---|---|
| Tesla FSD | End-to-end neural network, vision-only | No governance framework, no formal safety case, no bitwise verification |
| Waymo | Safety reports, simulation-heavy validation | Safety reports but no bitwise governance, no governance language |
| Mobileye RSS | Formal safety model (Responsibility-Sensitive Safety) | Mathematical safety model but no governance language, no bitwise encoding |
| AUTOSAR | Standardized automotive SW architecture | Architecture standard, no governance gates, no compliance verification |
| ISO/PAS 21448 SOTIF | Safety of intended functionality analysis | Analysis methodology, no runtime governance, no bitwise checking |
Gap: No existing system provides governance-gated vehicle control with O(1) bitwise compliance checking across ASIL levels and SAE autonomy levels simultaneously.
Patent Mapping
| PROV | Relevance | Claims |
|---|---|---|
| PROV-006 | PRIMARY | Governance-gated vehicle actuation, ASIL mapping, ODD enforcement |
| PROV-001 | Foundational | MAGIC private-check encoding for automotive governance verification |
| PROV-004 | Supporting | Transcompilation of ISO 26262/SAE J3016 to governed executables |
Cross-Domain Compositions
AUTOMOTIVE × ROBOTICS = Autonomous vehicles (ISO 26262 + SAE J3016 + ISO 10218)
AUTOMOTIVE × MANUFACTURING = Vehicle production governance (IATF 16949 + IEC 62443)
AUTOMOTIVE × ENERGY = EV charging governance (ISO 15118 + IEC 61851)
AUTOMOTIVE × LOGISTICS = Fleet management, autonomous trucking (SAE J3016 + ISO 3691-4)
AUTOMOTIVE × AEROSPACE = Flying cars / eVTOL (ISO 26262 + DO-178C)
AUTOMOTIVE × DEFENSE = Military vehicles (ISO 26262 + MIL-STD-882)
AUTOMOTIVE × QUALITY = Production quality (IATF 16949 + ISO 9001)
AUTOMOTIVE × SECURITY = Vehicle cybersecurity (ISO/SAE 21434 + IEC 62443)
8 cross-domain compositions. Each strengthens PROV-006 patent claims.
Axioms
1. Functional Safety Integrity
Vehicle systems MUST achieve the ASIL level determined by hazard analysis and risk assessment. No safety goal without ASIL assignment.
Example: Electric power steering loss at highway speed = ASIL D. The steering ECU MUST achieve SPFM ≥ 99%, PMHF < 10⁻⁸/h, and latent fault metric ≥ 90%. These metrics are not negotiable — they derive from the physics of the hazard.
2. OTA Update Governance
Over-the-air software updates to safety-relevant systems MUST be governed. No update without impact analysis, rollback capability, and informed consent.
Example: A brake calibration update pushed OTA MUST pass: (1) ISO 26262 change impact analysis, (2) SOTIF analysis for new behavior, (3) cybersecurity impact per ISO/SAE 21434, (4) regulatory notification per UNECE R156. The vehicle MUST verify update integrity before applying. Rollback MUST be available for 72 hours.
3. Cybersecurity by Design
Vehicle cybersecurity MUST be engineered from concept, not bolted on. Threat analysis MUST precede design.
Example: ISO/SAE 21434 requires TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment) at concept phase. A connected ECU with V2X capability MUST have: asset identification, threat scenarios, attack feasibility ratings, and cybersecurity goals — before a single line of code is written.
4. Type Approval Compliance
Vehicles MUST meet type approval requirements of every market where they are sold. No market entry without authority approval.
Example: A vehicle sold in the US and EU MUST comply with FMVSS (NHTSA) and UNECE regulations (EU). FMVSS 126 (ESC) and UNECE R140 (ESC) have different test procedures for the same function. Both MUST pass independently.
5. Recall Response
When a safety defect is identified, the manufacturer MUST initiate recall within the timeframe required by law. No delay for business reasons.
Example: NHTSA requires manufacturers to notify the agency within 5 business days of determining a safety defect exists. 49 CFR Part 573. The recall remedy MUST be provided at no cost to the owner. Every affected VIN MUST be traceable.
Examples
DECLARE(ASIL_D_SafetyCase) = ISO_26262 × CANONIC
Where:
ISO 26262 provides Structure:
- Hazard analysis and risk assessment (Part 3)
- System design (Part 4)
- Hardware design (Part 5)
- Software design (Part 6)
- Safety validation (Part 4)
CANONIC provides Governance:
- C1: Safety goals with ASIL assignment
- C2: Safety case evidence (FMEA, FTA, DFA, testing)
- Temporal: Product development lifecycle, field monitoring
- Relational: OEM/Tier1/Tier2 boundaries, market jurisdictions
- C5: Vehicle operations (driving modes, degraded states)
- C6: ISO 26262/AUTOSAR conformance
Result:
ASIL_D_SafetyCase = AGENT (#127)
Safety Lifecycle:
Concept — HARA completed, safety goals assigned
Design — Technical safety concept
Implement — SW/HW safety requirements verified
Validate — Safety validation complete
Release — Type approval granted
DECLARE(AutonomousVehicleODD) = SAE_J3016 × CANONIC
Where:
SAE J3016 provides Structure:
- Automation levels (0-5)
- Operational Design Domain (ODD)
- Dynamic Driving Task (DDT)
- DDT fallback
- Minimal Risk Condition (MRC)
CANONIC provides Governance:
- C1: ODD boundary claims (speed, weather, road type)
- C2: Scenario evidence (simulation, test track, public road)
- Temporal: ODD entry/exit timing, MRC response time
- Relational: Geographic/regulatory boundaries
- C5: Automated driving mode transitions
- C6: SAE/ISO/UNECE conformance
Result:
AutonomousVehicleODD at Level 4 = AGENT (#127)
ODD Lifecycle:
Define — ODD parameters specified
Simulate — Scenario coverage in simulation
Test — Track + public road validation
Certify — Regulatory approval
Operate — Public deployment within ODD
Validators
| Validator | Checks | Example Failure |
|---|---|---|
| C1 | Safety goals stated with ASIL assignment from HARA | ECU without safety classification |
| C2 | Safety case evidence complete (FMEA, FTA, test reports) | Missing diagnostic coverage analysis |
| Temporal | OTA update windows, recall response timelines | Recall notification beyond 5-day deadline |
| Relational | OEM/tier boundaries, market jurisdictions, V2X trust domains | OTA pushed outside approved market |
| C5 | Driving mode transitions governed, fallback operating | ADS engaged outside ODD |
| C6 | ISO 26262/AUTOSAR/UNECE conformance validated | Non-compliant safety architecture |
Application
To create a CANONIC automotive vertical:
- Identify vehicle system (powertrain, chassis, ADAS, ADS, body)
- Perform HARA and assign ASIL, map to MAGIC tier
- Create scope with CANON.md inheriting /AUTOMOTIVE/
- Define safety goals with ASIL assignment and technical safety concepts
- Map to regulatory framework (ISO 26262, SAE J3016, UNECE)
- Implement validators for safety evidence, OTA governance, cybersecurity
- Document coverage with safety case artifacts
Result: Owned automotive vertical with ASIL-governed, type-approved operations.
LEARNING
ROADMAP
VOCAB
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| AIAG | Automotive Industry Action Group. |
| ALKS | Automated Lane Keeping System. |
| AP | Application Protocol or Access Point. |
| ASIL | Automotive Safety Integrity Level |
| AUTOMOTIVE | Automotive industry vertical governance scope. |
| BSM | Basic Safety Message |
| CAL | Cybersecurity Assurance Level |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List or Configuration Release. |
| CSMS | Cyber Security Management System (energy sector). |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility. |
| DDT | Delivery Date/Time. |
| DEKRA | German vehicle inspection and certification organization. |
| DFMEA | Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. |
| DSRC | Dedicated Short-Range Communications |
| ECU | Electronic Control Unit |
| EDR | Event Data Recorder — vehicle black box. |
| ELKS | ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana) reference. |
| EU | Governed term in this scope vocabulary. |
| EV | Electric Vehicle. |
| FMEA | Failure Mode and Effects Analysis |
| FMVSS | Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards |
| GNSS | Governed term in this scope vocabulary. |
| GRR | Gauge Repeatability and Reproducibility. |
| GSR | General Safety Regulation |
| HARA | Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment |
| HSM | Hardware Security Module |
| HW | Hardware |
| IATF | International Automotive Task Force |
| IEEE | Governed term in this scope vocabulary. |
| IP | Governed term in this scope vocabulary. |
| ISA | International Society of Automation. |
| ISO | Governed term in this scope vocabulary. |
| LFM | Latent Fault Metric |
| MAP | Mapping or index artifact. |
| MRC | Minimal Risk Condition |
| MSA | Measurement Systems Analysis |
| NCAP | Network Capable Application Processor. |
| ODD | Operating Design Domain |
| OEDR | Object and Event Detection and Response |
| OS | Operating system. |
| OTA | Over-the-Air |
| PFMEA | Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. |
| PKI | Governed term in this scope vocabulary. |
| PMHF | Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware Failures |
| PPAP | Production Part Approval Process |
| PSW | Part Submission Warrant (PPAP). |
| RPN | Risk Priority Number (FMEA). |
| SAE | Society of Automotive Engineers |
| SCMS | Security Credential Management System |
| SOME | Partial coverage reference. |
| SPC | Statistical Process Control |
| SPFM | Single-Point Fault Metric |
| SW | Software |
| TARA | Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment |
| TIM | Thermal Interface Material. |
| TPMS | Tire Pressure Monitoring System. |
| TUV | Technischer Uberwachungsverein — German technical inspection. |
| UNECE | United Nations Economic Commission for Europe |
| US | Governed term in this scope vocabulary. |
| USB | Universal Serial Bus. |
| VDA | Verband der Automobilindustrie — German automotive standards. |
| WAVE | Wave energy reference. |
| WP | Waypoint or Work Package. |
INHERITANCE CHAIN
INDUSTRIES
INDUSTRY is the variable. SERVICE = PRIMITIVE(s) + INDUSTRY. Each vertical defines INTEL, CHAT, COIN.
MUST: Every INDUSTRY wires INTEL + CHAT + COIN MUST: Standards mapped to governance dimensions MUST: LANGUAGE cascades from MAGIC — no per-industry DESIGN.md MUST NOT: Create INDUSTRY without SERVICE proof
MAGIC
INTEL. CHAT. COIN. — Three primitives. One governed economy.
MUST: CANON.md in every scope
MUST: Services compose primitives — never duplicate
MUST: Primitive structure is fixed — industry is the only variable
MUST: Primitives compose into services — never duplicate
MUST: Services connect through SHOP.md and VAULT.md projection files
MUST: SHOP.md = public projection file (filesystem-discoverable, UPPERCASE per LANGUAGE)
MUST: VAULT.md = private projection file (filesystem-discoverable, auth-gated, UPPERCASE per LANGUAGE)
MUST: Instance = service projected through user governance context
MUST: Instance directories live at USER scope ({USER}/{PLURAL}/), not nested in SERVICES/
MUST: Service directories (SERVICES/{SINGULAR}/) define schemas — instances hold content
MUST: Every .md compiles to .json with the same name (direct mapping)
MUST: CANON.md = axiom + universal constraints only (no service names, no paths, no implementation)
MUST: README.md = how to run the CANON only
MUST: {SCOPE}.md = SPEC — the interface (purpose, routes, projections, ecosystem)
MUST NOT: Hardcode service names in CANON constraints (law speaks universals)
MUST: Inheritance resolves upward — scopes compose by directories
MUST: Tier algebra is canonical — DESIGN.md is the single source (COMPLIANCE tier algebra)
MUST NOT: Expose dimension internals to users or developers
MUST NOT: Hardcode outside governed contracts
MUST: Nonprofits get enterprise for free
MUST: ORG is the container; USER is the repo (`github.com/{org}/{user}`; duplicates across orgs allowed)
MUST: MARKET/ SALES/ GTM/ exist (META self-closure; one primitive each)
MUST: Each META sub-scope maps exactly one primitive (INTEL, CHAT, COIN)
MUST NOT: Add META business knowledge outside MAGIC/ scope
MUST NOT: Remove META sub-scope without replacing its primitive coverage
MUST: `{SCOPE}.md` is the scope contract surface; it MUST NOT be treated as a generic filename placeholder
MUST: LEARNING.md is the terminal — governance evidence, patterns, epoch rotation
MUST: LEARNING/ is the IDF directory — machine-generated individual data files
MUST: LEARNING.md rotates at epoch boundaries — frozen epochs archive as LEARNING-{EPOCH}.md at scope root
MUST: LEARNING.md is always the current epoch — active, append-only
MUST: Epoch boundary = EVOLUTION signal in LEARNING.md (named, dated, sourced)
MUST NOT: Delete archived LEARNING epochs — append-only history
MUST: MAGIC defines the triad interface directly:
MUST: COMPLIANCE/ + GALAXY/ + SURFACE/
MUST NOT: Define conflicting tier algebra in downstream scopes; downstream must inherit this contract
FOUNDATION
SPEC = {SCOPE}. The LANGUAGE. The v0 discovery.
MUST: LANGUAGE defines all governance primitives MUST: Every scope inherits from FOUNDATION MUST: Triad (CANON.md + VOCAB.md + README.md) in every scope MUST NOT: Define terms outside VOCAB.md MUST NOT: Hardcode outside the kernel SHOULD: Vocabulary closure — every term resolves to a definition